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Some analysts argue that US drone strikes targeting militants in the North Waziristan (NW) region of 
the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan reduce militant activity. Others 
argue that these CIA-led strikes increase this activity. Cause and effect are difficult to disentangle 
because common underlying factors may drive both forms of violence. We use weather to identify a 
positive and large causal effect of drone strikes in NW on suicide attacks nationwide in Pakistan. 
Specifically, we use cloud cover and precipitation data for the NW, plus a dummy variable for a specific 
drone base closure, to instrument for drone strikes in the NW between July 2008 and the end of 2016 
and identify a casual effect on suicide bombings in the whole country during this period. The idea is 
that drone strikes, but not suicide bombings, rely on good weather and appropriate air bases for their 
feasibility and effectiveness. We find that each drone strike causes, on average, at least 1 suicide 
bombing within the subsequent month, usually within a radius of 0 to 400 kilometers from the strike 
point. Strikes that eliminate militants’ leadership provoke particularly large reactions. We characterize 
27-33 percent of all suicide bombings from July 2008 through 2016 as reactions to drone strikes. These 













1 Introduction  
 
The United States, effectively, went to war against Al Qaeda and affiliated militants after the September 
2001 attack. Along the way, the Bush administration reinstated a policy, which had been banned since 
1976, of targeted assassinations by the US military and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to 
eliminate overseas actors deemed to be hostile (Williams, 2010).  The US also introduced unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs), also known as drones, into this assassination campaign. Drones are widely 
viewed as attractive weapons because of their relatively low cost, surveillance capabilities, ability to 
strike precise GPS points while keeping operators safe from life-threatening risks.1  
The Waziristan region of what was formerly known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 
of Pakistan has been a focus for US drone activity with the CIA leading a hunt for Al Qaeda members 
and allies.2 The database of the New America Foundation records 414 drone strikes in the FATA 
targeting a variety of militant groups.3  
Recent scholarly literature is divided about the impact of the US drone program in Pakistan.   Johnston 
(2012), Johnston and Sarbahi (2016) and Mir and Moore (2018) argue that drone strikes have tended to 
suppress militant violence while Jaeger and Siddique (2018),  Mahmood and Jetter (2019) and Rigterink 
(2021) argue, broadly, that the strikes may have been counterproductive. We consider exactly this 
question of whether or not these strikes have been effective in deterring violence. Our main innovation 
is to use variation in cloud cover and precipitation plus the closure of a drone base to instrument for 
drone strikes, thereby addressing an endogeneity issue that plagues efforts to identify a causal 
relationship between drone strikes and militant violence.4 A second contribution is that we account for 
                                                             
1 Military drones can stay airborne for over 24 hours and are cheaper than fighter jets. Predator and Reaper drones 
cost around $4.5 million and $22 million, respectively, whereas F-16’s and F-35’s cost $47 million and $148-
$337 million, respectively. General David Deptula described drones as offering the promise “to project power 
without projecting vulnerability” (Gusterson, 2016). 
2 The FATA was a federally administered tribal area of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan and consisting of seven 
agencies (North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Kurram, Orakzai, Khyber, Mohmand and Bajuar) until it was 
officially merged with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in 2018.  The drone program in the region was almost 
entirely run by the CIA, a prime exception being the May 2016 killing of Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar 
Mohammad Mansour in Baluchistan which was carried out by the US military (Feffer, 2016).  
3 For more information see  https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/americas-counterterrorism-wars/pakistan/  
4 Mahmood and Jetter (2019) use wind speed in an instrumental variables approach that is similar in spirit to our 
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spatial heterogeneity in the distribution of suicide bombings. Third, we eliminate noise by focusing 
specifically on suicide bombings, the weapon of choice for the Islamist militants the CIA targets with 
its drone strikes.5  We find that drone strikes cause at least one suicide attack, on average, within the 
ensuing month which is likely to occur within a 0-400 kilometer radius of the strike point.  We calculate 
that roughly 27-33 percent of suicide bombings in Pakistan between July 2008 and the end of 2016 are 
attributable to drone strikes. 




Drones are not new to the battlefield.  For example, Iran used primitive drones to fire rocket-propelled 
grenades during the Iran- Iraq war in the 1980’s (Gusterson, 2016). But in the 21st century the US has 
mobilized its technologically sophisticated Predator and Reaper drones into campaigns that are 
unprecedented in their sheer scale and capabilities.6    
The CIA’s first drone strike in Pakistan killed Taliban leader Nek Muhammad in South Waziristan 
(Mazetti, 2013) in June of 2004 after fighting in Afghanistan had prompted some Taliban and Al Qaeda 
fighters to relocate to the FATA and use it as a launching pad for attacks in both Afghanistan and 
Pakistan (Shahzad, 2011). International pressure and militant bombing campaigns within Pakistan then 
led the Pakistani government to overcome its initial reluctance to expel militants from these areas 
(Aslam, 2011) and the CIA was allowed to initiate a parallel and complementary campaign to target 
militants in the region using combat drones.  The drone campaign started slowly with 9 strikes during 
2005-2007 but then picked up pace as the Bush administration dramatically increased to 36 strikes in 
                                                             
use of cloud cover. 
5 Our focus on suicide attacks is meant to eliminate some noise that comes from lumping together various attack 
types.  For example, drone strikes are unlikely to drive assassinations of leaders of competing ethnic groups.   
6 Predator drones, first developed in the 1990’s, weigh just 1130 pounds, can fly up to 25,000 feet and as fast as 
135 miles per hour.  Predators can stay airborne for 24 hours and are normally equipped with two Hellfire missiles.  
Reaper drones are still higher in quality, attaining twice the top speed and altitude of the Predators and carrying 
more missile types (Gusterson, 2016).  
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2008.7  The number of strikes then ballooned up to 122 in 2010 alone and remained high until falling 
back to just 10 in 2015 and progressing down to single digits by 2018.  
The US maintains that drones decapitate militant organizations and disrupt their activities through 
precision strikes that do not put American lives at risk.  Johnston and Sarbahi (2016), Mir and Moore 
(2018), Byman (2013) and Horowitz, Kreps and Fuhrmann (2016)) all make cases for drone programs 
broadly in these terms.8  However, critics argue that drone strikes breach international law, especially 
in countries like Pakistan and Somalia that are not officially at war with the US.  They also stress 
collateral effects such as civilian fatalities (Lamb, Woods and Yusufzai, 2012), mental trauma suffered 
by residents of areas targeted through drones (Stanford Law School and New York University School 
of Law, 2012) and injury to the legitimacy of the governments of countries where the US makes drone 
strikes (Boyle, 2013).  Finally, several recent papers argue that drone strikes are counterproductive, 
blowing back into increased violence against the US and its allies (Feffer, 2016; Jaeger and Siddique, 
2018; Mahmood and Jetter, 2019; Rigterink, 2021). Our paper focuses on potential blowback, 
specifically taking the form of suicide attacks that might be connected with drone strikes in Pakistan.   
2.2 Descriptive Statistics on Drone Strikes and Suicide 
Bombings 
 
The database of the New America Foundation, (Bergen, Sterman, & Salyk-Virk, 2021), shows a sharp 
rise and subsequent fall in drone-strike frequency under Obama (Table 2.1  & Figure 2.1) with a much 
smaller spike in civilian casualties (Table 2.1).   Drone strikes under Obama appear to have been more 
precisely targeted on militants (Table 2.1), an outcome that Gusterson (2016) attributes to better 
technology, such as Reaper drones, and tighter protocols governing the strikes.9  The database credits 
                                                             
7 Williams (2010) argues that Bush’s failure to seek Pakistani consent for the US drone programme in Pakistan 
fuelled a subsequent spike in suicide attacks.  Interviews by Mir and Moore (2018) do suggest, however, that 
President Musharaf did secretly approve an increase in strike frequency in response to pressure following the 
assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.  Of course, targeted organizations would not have been 
privy to such a secret agreement so Williams (2010) could still be right. 
8 The program had operated for about 10 years before it was officially acknowledged in 2012. Yet it was an open 
secret with then CIA Director Leon Panetta commenting back in 2009 that “Very frankly, it’s the only game in 
town in terms of confronting or trying to disrupt the al Qaeda leadership” (Williams, 2010)  
9 Reapers can carry more precise and smarter missiles in addition to Hellfire missiles. The rules for drone strikes 
were also tightened in May 2013 under pressure from human rights groups and a few European countries.  
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the Bush era strikes with 0.35 militant leaders killed per strike compared to just 0.18 for the Obama 
period, but the Bush results come at the cost of 7-8 civilians killed per militant leader killed compared 
to around 2 for Obama.  Gusterson (2016) suggests that the new Obama policy of “signature strikes,” 
i.e., monitoring behavior of suspects who are then struck if their behavior is found to be consistent with 
militancy, can largely explain the differences between the Bush and Obama administrations where the 
former executed strikes based on pre-decided kill lists (Gusterson, 2016).  The observation period of 
the signature strikes seems to have saved the lives of civilians while expanding targeting to include 
more low-ranking militants than had previously been the case.  In addition to the moral advantages of 
better targeting, one might expect more precise strikes to be more effective at countering militant 





Table 2.1 Comparative Statistics of Drone Strikes 
 Bush Obama Trump Total 
Total Strikes 48 353 13 414 
Civilian 
Casualties 
116-137 129-162 0-4 245-303 
Militant 
Casualties 
218-326 1659-2683 33-62 1910-3071 
Unknown 
Casualties 
65-77 146-249 0-2 211-328 
















6.79 7.60 4.77 7.42 
Total Casualties 
Per Strike (Min) 
8.31 5.48 2.54 5.71 
Total Casualties 
Per Strike (Max) 
11.25 8.76 5.23 8.94 





Suicide bombing trends track drone strike trends fairly well (Figure 2.1).   
 
Figure 2.1 Trends in Drones Strikes and Suicide Bombings in Pakistan 
 
Data sources: Drone Strikes: New American Foundation database on drone strikes in Pakistan. Suicide 




Moreover, following the methodology presented in Jaeger and Paserman (2008), Figure 2.2 shows 
average numbers of suicide bombings X  days after drone-strike days minus the overall average of drone 
strikes per day over the whole period for all X between 1 and 31 days.  We see elevated rates of suicide 
attacks throughout these drone-strike aftermaths with many statistically significant differences 
appearing three days after the drone strike.  Saeed, Spagat and Overton (2019) show that these 
deviations sum roughly to 1, implying one extra suicide attack within a month of a drone strike. More 
conservatively, the sum of the statistically significant deviations is around 0.68.  So drone strikes do 
appear to be associated with elevated suicide bombing rates although we cannot make a good causal 
claim based on this analysis. 
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Figure 2.2  Mean Deviations of Average Suicide Bombings Over 31 Days Following Drone Strikes 
 
The numbers of the Y axis represent deviations of the average number of suicide bombings on X days after drone 
strikes from the overall average number of suicide bombings. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1 
%, 5 % and 10 % respectively. Data sources: Drone Strikes: New American Foundation database on drone strikes 
in Pakistan. Suicide bombings: Chicago Project on Security and Threat, University of Chicago. 
 
3 Literature and Hypotheses 
 
The relevant literature divides along two distinct lines.  The first divide is on the question of whether 
drone strikes deter or incite violence. The second divide is over methodology; some study local public 
opinion over drone strikes while others study the dynamics of strikes and militant violence.  
Our paper focuses on the violent dynamics but here we pause briefly to consider the public opinion 
literature. A 2014 PEW survey found that 2 Pakistanis in 3 oppose drone strikes, suggesting rather 
strong opposition to the policy (Pew Research Center, 2014). 10  However, this survey did not cover the 
tribal areas where, plausibly, support for drone strikes aimed at ridding these areas of local violent actors 
could be much stronger than it is in the rest of the country. Nevertheless, a 2010 survey that covered 
tribal populations found that a whopping 90% of the population opposed US military operations in the 
region (Ballen, Bergen and Doherty, 2010). Shah (2018), on the other hand, criticized the PEW survey 
for its incomplete coverage and the Ballen, Bergen and Doherty (2010) survey for “social desirability 
                                                             
10 See detailed survey at https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2014/08/27/a-less-gloomy-mood-in-pakistan/ 
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bias,” i.e., that respondents feared retaliation from militants if they failed to oppose drone strikes.   Shah 
(2018) asked North Waziristan residents whether drone strikes created new militants and found that 71 
percent of his respondents said that they did not while only 8 percent said that they did with the rest 
unsure. At first glance, the results of Shah (2018) seem to be in strong conflict with the previous survey 
work although many people can simultaneously oppose drone strikes while not believing that they incite 
people to join militant groups.  Moreover, the sample of Shah (2018) appears to be rather biased towards 
sections of the tribal society such as tribal elders, maliks (official headmen), lawyers, reporters, 
officials, and students who are the sort of people targetted by the Taliban target and may, therefore, be 
more likely than the rest of the population to support drone strikes. Even so, the contrast between 
findings from tribal and non-tribal population samples in the Shah (2018) and (Pew Research Center, 
2014) surveys, respectively, is striking. Silverman (2018) suggests that people in tribal areas may better 
understand the positive effects of drone strikes in their region than people living outside the region do 
and that knowledge of and support for drone strikes goes hand in hand. We make no attempt to resolve 
these disagreements here and simply note that average levels of public support for drone strikes are, at 
best, one factor among several in driving the dynamics of violence in Pakistan. It is, for example, 
possible that large numbers of Pakistanis are supportive of drone strikes while, simultaneously, a small 
sliver of society hates the strikes so passionately that they are driven into the arms of militant groups.    
Johnston and Sarbahi (2016) and Mir and Moore (2018) operate within the violence dynamics branch 
of the literature, both finding that drone strikes deter militants’ violence within the tribal areas and 
vicinity. Mir and Moore (2018) find that the whole drone program made a major contribution to 
deterring violence, with 75 percent of this violence-suppressing impact coming from the anticipatory 
effect of drone strikes which, they argue, changed the behavior of militants by, for example, restricting 
their movements and breaking down internal trust. In contrast, Johnston and Sarbahi (2016) focus, in 
contrast, on the effect of individual drone strikes which, they find, led to around a 5 percentage points 
decrease in the terrorist incidents. Both of these studies look for reactions only nearby to where drone 
strikes occur and not further afield in Pakistan. Yet Saeed and Syed (2016) find that militants emerge 
from a variety of geographical areas in Pakistan, not just the tribal ones. Thus, one might expect drone 
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strikes to incite reactions throughout Pakistan, not just in the tribal areas where they occur. Indeed, 
Jaeger and Siddique (2018), consider reactions throughout Pakistan and find evidence of militant 
reaction within a week following drone strikes.  
All of the above works on drone-militant dynamics relies on an assumption that drone strikes are 
exogenous events although there is good reason to question this assumption. First, Islamabad 
clandestinely coordinates the drone campaign with the CIA. Pakistani intelligence agencies serve up 
militants as CIA targets whom they know to have perpetrated violence within Pakistan.11 Thus, there is 
a plausible channel of causation running from militant attacks to drone strikes, operating through 
Pakistani intelligence agencies and the CIA.  Second, the activity of both militant violence and drone 
strikes can plausibly be affected by some common underlying factors such as group sizes of militant 
organizations and locations and episodes of infighting. Failure to account for these factors can cause 
correlations between the error terms in econometric models meant to explain militant violence and the 
drone strike variable used as an explanatory variable in these models.  
Mahmood and Jetter (2019) address this endogeneity problem by using wind speed as an instrument for 
drone strikes. They find, in contrast to Johnston and Sarbahi (2016) and Mir and Moore (2018), that 1 
drone strike generates roughly 4 terrorist attacks over the subsequent 7 days and that drone strikes 
explain around 16 percent of all terrorist incidents within Pakistan between 2006 and 2016.  Rigterink 
(2021) uses success versus failure of attempts to assassinate top terrorist leaders with drone attacks as 
quasi-random outcomes to identify a causal effect of drone strike hits on subsequent terrorist attacks. 
                                                             
11 Pakistan has always officially denied its involvement in the drone program. However, there is ample evidence 
to suggest otherwise. Miller and Woodward (2013) quotes from CIA documents and Pakistan’s diplomatic memos 
showing that Pakistani officials were regularly briefed about the drone strikes.  On the 12th of February 2009, 
Dianne Feinstein, Chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, acknowledged that drones were flying from an air 
base within Pakistan. Indeed, the Times later published images from Google Earth showing drones parked at 
Shamsi Airbase in Baluchistan, Pakistan, implicating the Pakistan military in the program (Page, 2009). President 
and former Army Chief Pervez Musharraf admitted in a 2013 CNN interview that Pakistan did consent to some 
drone strikes while Mir and Moore (2018) quotes officials from the US and Pakistan reporting that Musharraf 
offered the CIA a “flight box” over North Waziristan. Even Pakistan’s civilian leadership had no qualms about 
the drone program; an August 2008 cable, published by Wikileaks, quotes the Prime Minister of Pakistan Yusuf 
Raza Gilani telling US Ambassador Anne Patterson that “I don't care if they do it as long as they get the right 
people. We'll protest in the National Assembly and then ignore it." For more see Mir and Moore (2018), Robertson 
and Botelho (2013), Mazetti (2013) and Miller and Woodward (2013) 
12 
 
Our work differs from Mahmood and Jetter (2019) in three main ways. First, we consider a range of 
potential instruments and find that cloud cover, precipitation and the date of a major drone base closure 
in Pakistan outperform wind speed as instruments for drone strikes. Second, we focus exclusively on 
suicide bombings which are the best documented and most lethal method of militant violence, 
particularly against targets such as military or foreign installations due to their international 
connections. Third, we also account for spatial variation in the distribution of suicide bombings carried 
out in response to drone strikes.  The identification strategy of Rigterink (2021), hits versus misses, is 
entirely different from both ours and that of Mahmood and Jetter (2019) while our other differences 
from the latter paper also apply to the former one.  Rigerink(2021) also considers other questions such 
as impacts on the types of terrorist attacks.  
The above discussion shows that the existing evidence is mixed on whether drone strikes are effective 
in countering terrorism. One side of the argument maintains that drone strikes can disrupt and degrade 
terrorist networks and hence affect their ability to perpetrate violence (Johnston, 2012: Johnston and 
Sarbahi, 2016; Mir and Moore, 2018), leading to our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1A: All else equal, drone strikes lead to a reduction in suicide bombing. 
On the other hand, patterns in suicide bombing following drone strikes in Pakistan are suggestive of 
blowback effect (Figure II: Jaeger and Siddique (2018): Mahmood and Jetter, 2019: Rigterink, 2021). 
The theoretical argument in support of these patterns is that drone strikes kill innocent people, not just 
the militants, and hence incite anger, national outrage and result in violence (Kilcullen and Exum, 2009, 
Feffer, 2016).  This leads to our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1B: All else equal, drone strikes lead to an increase in suicide bombing. 
In the next section, we outline the econometric methodology we use to test the causal impact of drone 
strikes on suicide bombings.  




We assess the impact of drone strikes on suicide bombing using regression analysis.  However, the 
standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) approach, illustrated in equation (1) below, is inadequate due 
to endogeneity problems (Green, 2003): 
𝑆𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝐵𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝑋𝑡
`𝛽 + 𝜀𝑡          (1) 
where 𝑋𝑡
`  is a matrix of control variables and 𝜀𝑡 is an error term. Specifically, the error term in a 
regression of suicide bombings on drone strikes could be correlated with the drone-strike variable, 
rendering the OLS estimates to be biased.  
Reasons for endogeneity problems abound.  First, there is measurement error in part because we must 
extract our data from imperfect news stories.   Second, there may be reverse causation whereby suicide 
bombings also cause drone strikes, in part because suicide attacks provide information on possible 
whereabouts of terrorist groups while also exerting pressure for responses.  Third, both suicide 
bombings and drone strikes may be affected by common factors that are omitted from the regression. 
For instance, reports of infighting amongst militant groups could affect their capacity to carry out 
suicide bombings while at the same time increasing their visibility and, hence, vulnerability to drone 
strikes (Craig & Khan, 2014). Other factors such as the geographical locations of militant groups and 
their sizes and strengths might simultaneously affect both suicide bombings and drone strikes.  
Governments and militant groups are unlikely to share detailed information on such factors so they are 
unobservable and, therefore, not included in estimated models.   OLS estimation of equation 1 can, 
therefore, lead to errors in the signs, magnitudes and p values of our estimates.  
We use cloud cover, precipitation and a dummy for the closure of a drone base in Pakistan as 
instruments for drone strikes to counter the endogeneity issues.  Weather conditions affect the flying 
and targeting capabilities of drones (Mahmood and Jetter, 2019; C., Wood, personal communication, 
March 02, 2019; J., Bronk, personal communication, March 06, 2019; W., Zwijnenburg, personal 
communication, March 07, 2019; United States Government Accountability Office, 2017; Gusterson, 
2016; Whitlock, 2014; Fowler, 2014).12 Drone operators gather evidence through live camera 
                                                             
12 We corresponded with Chris Woods (Director Airwars), Justin Bronk (Research Fellow/Editor Royal United 
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surveillance (Gusterson, 2016).13  Cloud cover and related conditions, such as rain, impede this camera-
based surveillance and also hinder take-offs and landings.14 Also, the missiles in use for Predator and 
Reaper drones during this our time period, such as the GBU-12 and the AGM-114 Hellfire, require clear 
lines of sight for targeting.15  Hence cloud cover and rain, as measured through precipitation, are 
important factors which influence both visual monitoring and immediate combat capabilities for drones. 
At the same time, clouds and precipitation should not directly affect suicide attacks.  Thus, these two 
weather variables appear to be excellent candidates for instruments, either alone or in combination. We 
also use a qualitatively different instrument in the form of a dummy variable for the closing of Shamsi 
airbase in Baluchistan province of Pakistan on November 26, 2011.16  NATO had just accidentally 
killed 24 Pakistani soldiers at a checkpoint on the Pakistan-Afghan border and Pakistani officials felt 
pressure to take visible action against the US.  Shamsi base was a workhorse facility for surveillance 
and combat drone missions at that time and its closure compromised drone operations without directly 
affecting suicide attacks.    
Our first-stage model is:  
𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1(𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑡 + 𝛼2(𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑡 + 𝑋𝑡
′𝛼 + 𝛾𝑡     (2) 
Where X is a matrix of control variables and 𝛾𝑡 is the error term.  The second-stage equation 
incorporates the predicted values for drones from the first stage model as an independent variable. 
𝑆𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝐵𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠)𝑡 + 𝑋𝑡
` 𝛽 + 𝜀𝑡      (3) 
                                                             
Services Institute, Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies) and Wim Zwijnenburg 
(Program Leader Humanitarian Disarmament, PAX for Peace) and received valuable input about how weather 
conditions such as cloud cover affect targeting through these missiles.  
13 Other than the camera, the sensor ball also contains equipment for capturing mobile signals on the ground 
(Gusterson, 2016). See the BBC’s report on how drones works at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-
10713898  
14 According to United States Government Accountability Office, 20 percent of Predator B mission cancellations 
during the period 2013-2016 were due to these weather conditions (United States Government Accountability 
Office, 2017).  
15 GBU-12 and AGM-114 are semi-active laser homing missiles and cloud cover can cause beam distortion and 
attenuation for the spotting laser which the weapons home in on (C., Wood, personal communication, March 02, 
2019; J., Bronk, personal communication, March 06, 2019; W., Zwijnenburg, personal communication, March 
07, 2019).  
16 See Henderon, (2011) and Dawn, (2011) for more on the Shamsi airbase closure.  
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We employ Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML), Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) and Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) estimators for this final equation with each method 
offering some advantages. 2SLS is simple, intuitive and widely understood while GMM is suitable for 
over-identified models and LIML, which is asymptotically equivalent to 2SLS, outperforms 2SLS with 
weak instruments and also exhibits less bias than the other estimators (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). 
5 Data Sources  
 
5.1 Dependent Variables: Suicide Bombings 
 
The data for incidents and casualties in suicide bombings is taken from Chicago Project on Security and 
Threats (CPOST), University of Chicago, database. The CPOST database is one of the most prolific 
and widely used data repositories on suicide bombings.  
5.2 Instrumented Variables: Incidence and Casualties of 
Drone Strikes 
 
The data for drone strike incidents and casualties is taken from the New America Foundation (NAF) 
database which records 414 drone strikes in Pakistan between 2004 and 2018.  The Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism (BIJ) and the Long War Journal (LWJ) are alternative sources, recording 430 
and 404 drone strikes, respectively, during the same period. However, we use the NAF database because 
it provides detail not just on civilian casualties but also on identities of militant leaders, enabling an 
analysis of the impact of drone strikes that kill leadership figures leaders on suicide bombings.   
5.3 Instrumental Variables: Cloud Cover, Precipitation 




The data for cloud cover and precipitation comes from World Weather Online which is one of the largest 
online repositories of weather data covering approximately 3 million cities/towns worldwide.17 Cloud 
cover is measured as the percentage of sky covered by clouds. Total precipitation is measured in 
millimeters.  The dummy for drone base closure is 0 before November 26, 2011 and 1 afterwards. We 
purchased weather data for just North Waziristan which experienced 70 percent of all drone strikes in 
Pakistan between July 2008 and December 2016.18  Accordingly, our empirical analysis includes only 
drone strikes in North Waziristan.   
5.4 Other Control Variables 
 
Controls include dummies for the holy months of Ramadan and Muharram, Parliamentary election 
periods and three military offensives by Pakistan’s military. Islamic tradition discourages fighting 
during the month of Ramadan, possibly explaining some variation in suicide bombings (Jaeger and 
Siddique, 2018).  Muharram is also an important religious month, particularly for Shiites, who march 
in processions in remembrance of death of Prophet Muhammad’s grandson Hussain. Many Sunni 
militants in Pakistan consider Shiites to be heretic and target them particularly during this month, 
sometimes with suicide bombs. Pakistani militants oppose parliamentary forms of government and, 
hence, can be expected to launch suicide attacks for subversion during election periods.19 The major 
Pakistani military operations known as Zarb e Azab (Sharp and Cutting Strike), Rah-e- Haq (Just Path) 
and Rah-e-Rast (Righteous Path) can be expected to influence suicide bombings.20 Staniland, Mir and 
Lalwani (2018) provide the dates for these operations. Our final controls are dummies on the years 
2011, 2012 and 2013 21 
We report descriptive statistics for all the variables in the Appendix 
                                                             
17 See https://www.worldweatheronline.com/aboutus.aspx for more information.  
18 We are restricted to this time period because world weather online data for North Waziristan starts from July 
2008 and suicide bombing data terminates in 2016.  
19  For more on the Taliban’s threat to elections see (Farhan & Mallet, 2013) 
20 The time periods for the three offensives in our models are 2014 to the end of our study period, September 2007 
to February 2009 and May 2009 to July 2009 for Zarb e Azab, Rah e Haq and Rah e Rast respectively. 
21 We do not use dummies for years 2008, 2009, 2010, 2014, 2015 and 2016 due to the high correlation of these 






5.1 The Main Results 
 
Table 2.2 shows second stage estimates, with time resolved down to the weekly level, using Limited 
Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML), Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and Two-Stage 
Least Square (2SLS) estimators. Drone-strike coefficients are always positive with significance levels 
between 5% and 1%. The magnitudes of the estimates are large, ranging between 0.37 and 0.43, 
suggesting that every three drone strikes cause more than one suicide bombing within a week on 
average.  Although one should not focus much attention on coefficient estimates for control variables 
it does seem worth noting that Zarb-e-Azab offensive does seem to be associated with a sharp drop in 
suicide bombings.  The instruments appear to be quite strong with the first stage F statistics much larger 
than the conventional benchmark of 10 (Cragg and Donald, 1993). The final column in table 2.2 
suggests that each drone strike causes roughly 9 suicide bombing deaths on average, a large effect 
indeed.    
The estimate for drone strikes in the OLS small and insignificant (Table 2.2).  However, results from 
several diagnostics tests suggest that drone strikes is an endogenous covariate in the model for suicide 




Table 2.2 Instrumental Variable Regressions (Week-Level Contemporaneous 
Impact) 
 Dependent Variable:  Number of Suicide Bombings 
(Fatalities in Suicide Bombings for the Final Column) 
 











































Yes No  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st Stage F 
statistic 
 
 20.98 20.86 49.38 49.38 49.38 49.38 




0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
The dependent variable is the number of suicide attacks in all columns except for the last one for 
which it is the number of fatalities in suicide attacks.   All models include a constant and have 442 
observations.  p values are in parentheses. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05 and * p<0.10. 
 
Table 2.3 gives results from further diagnostic tests. The endogeneity test of Baum. Schaffer and 
Stillman (2007) rejects in all models the null hypothesis that drone strikes are exogenous, thereby 
supporting our initial premise that research needs to address the endogeneity of drone strikes.22 Next 
we consider the requirement that our instruments should be correlated with drone strikes but not with 
the error terms in the estimated equations.  Indeed, our Hansen J tests  (Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 
2007), reject the hypothesis of correlations between the instruments and the error terms in all models.  
Next, as further checks for possible weakness of our instruments, we perform Montiel Olea-Pflueger 
tests, which are robust to both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Montieal-Olea and Pflueger, 
                                                             
22 This test is implemented in Stata and is based on difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics.  These statistics 
are obtained by first estimating an equation which treat suspect regressors as endogenous and then another 




2013). This test examines the possibility that the bias of an IV estimator exceeds a certain fraction, τ, 
of worst-case bias which arises if all the instruments are irrelevant. The effective F statistic is larger 
than the critical value for a 5 % worst case bias at a signifiance level of 1 %. In other words it is highly 
unlikely that our instruments suffer from bias which, in any case, would not exceed 5 % of worst case 
bias.   
Finally, we employ the LM redundancy test to check whether we may be using too many instruments 
(Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2007) and always reject the hypothesis of redundant instruments.     
To summarize, Tables 2.2  and 2.3 support the blowback idea encapsulated in hypothesis 1B and this 
finding is robust to a wide range of diagnostic tests.  
Table 2.3 Results for Diagnostic Tests 
  
Test for Endogeneity 











Hansen J Over-identification Test H0= 
CloudCover *Precipitation and Drone Base 








Montiel-Pflueger Weak Instrument Test 
H0= Bias in the  IV estimator exceeds 
percentage τ of worst case bias  
                      Effective F Statistic  
Critical value for 5 % worst case bias at 1 % 


















LM Test of Instrument Redundancy 
H0= Instrument is redundant 
 
Cloud cover * Precipitation= 6.35 (0.01) 
Base closure = 29.06 (0.00) 
 
  p values are in the parentheses 
We now repeat our analysis but changing the time resolution to two-week periods (Table 2.4).  The 
results are broadly consistent with what we found at 1-week time resolution with the coefficients on 




Table 2.4 Instrumental Variable Regressions (Two-Week Level 
Contemporaneous Impact) 
` 
Dependent Variable:  Number of Suicide Bombings 
 
D.V= Number of 
Fatalities in Suicide 
Bombing 
 









    0.428** 
    (0.02) 
    0.416** 
    (0.02) 
     0.371** 
     (0.04) 
    0.371** 
    (0.03) 
    0.371 
    (0.11) 
    9.21** 




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time 
Dummies 
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st Stage F 
statistic 
16.30 16.30  25.67  25.67 25.67  25.67 
F Statistic 9.60 9.60  7.30   7.31   9.39   4.01 
Probability
>Chi2 
0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
The dependent variable is the number of suicide attacks in all columns except for the last one for 
which it is the number of fatalities in suicide attacks.  All models include a constant and have 222 
observations.  p values are in parentheses. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05 and * p<0.10. 
 
Table 2.5 repeats our 2SLS analysis but with time divided, first, into three-week periods and, second, 
into four-week periods.  The results, combined with the previous ones, suggest that much of the reaction 
to drone strikes is loaded into the last two weeks of the four-week aftermath.  The coefficient on drone 
strikes exceed 1 already within the three-week window and rises to around 1.6 within the four-week 
window.   These estimates are reminiscent of, but substantially larger than, the findings shown in figure 
2.2 that did not account for endogeneity. These results further strengthen the evidence for the blowback 




Table 2.5 Instrumental Variable Regression (Follow-up Impact) 
 
Dependent Variable 
Number of Suicide Bombings In 
period of t+ 3 weeks 
Dependent Variable 
Number of Suicide Bombings in 
period of t+ 4 weeks 
Variables 






















Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies No Yes No Yes 
F stat 11.14 8.64 12.17 9.65 
prob>f 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
All models contain a constant. Models for  t+3 weeks suicide bombings have 439 observations. 
Models for t+4 weeks suicide bombings have 438 observations.  Parentheses contain p values. *** 
p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05 and * p<0.10. 
 
5.2 Decapitation Effects 
 
We now focus attention just on drone strikes that eliminate militant leaders, i.e., so-called “decapitation” 
strikes.  Jordan (2009) argues that the effectiveness of decapitation strikes depends upon a constellation 
of factors, such as group size, age and effectiveness in replacing leadership while Pape (2003) finds 
little evidence of their effectiveness in his study on suicide terrorism. On the other hand, Johnston 
(2012), accounting for endogeneity and measurement error, and Johnston and Sarbahi (2016) both 
found that decapitation reduces violence.  Most recently, Rigterink (2021) found a causal blowback 
effect.  
Our instrumental variables analysis, using 2SLS, suggests that decapitating drone strikes increase 
suicide bombings (Table 2.6), that is, we agree with Rigterink (2021) using an identification approach 
completely different from hers.  The magnitude of our estimated drone-strike coefficient 2.78 is 
significantly larger than our estimated coefficients for all drone strikes, although statistical significance 
is only at the 10% level.  Diagnostic tests support both the endogeneity of decapitation strikes and the 
strength of our instruments. 
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Table 2.6 Instrumental Variable Regressions (Decapitation Effect) 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Number of Suicide 
Bombings 
 Variables  
                       2SLS with 
Newey-West S.E. 
Leader Killed in Drone Strike 
2.78* 
(0.07) 
Other Control Variables Yes 
Time Dummies Yes 
1st Stage F statistic  8.86 
Montiel-Pflueger Weak Instrument Test 
H0= Bias in the  IV estimator exceeds percentage τ of worst case bias  
Effective F Statistic  








Endogeneity Test  
Null Hypothesis= Variables are Exogenous 
4.84 
(0.01) 
F Statistic 6.08 
prob> F 0.00 
All models contain a constant and have 442 observations.  Parentheses contain p values. *** p< 
0.01, ** p< 0.05 and * p<0.10. 
 
2.5.3 Spatial Distribution Effects 
 
All of the above results concern suicide attacks at the national level.  We now distinguish between four 
different areas at increasingly large distances from North Waziristan (Table 2.7).  The estimates suggest 
that most of the first-week suicide-bombing reaction to drone strikes occurs between 100 and 300 
kilometers from North Waziristan.23  
  
                                                             
23 The results for regions beyond 400 kilometers are very small so we do not report them here.    
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Table 2.7 Spatial Allocation Effects 
 Dependent Variable:  Number of Suicide Bombings 
Variables 
Between 0-100 
KM from NW 
Between 100-200 
KM  from NW 
Between 200-300 
KM from NW 
Between 300-400 












Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F stat 3.43 6.14 3.38 1.75 
prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 
All models contain a constant and have 442 observations.  Parentheses contain p values. *** p< 
0.01, ** p< 0.05 and * p<0.10. 
 
Table 2.8 repeats the analysis of Table 2.7 but with time counted in four-week intervals.  The findings 
from predicted spatial allocation effects are reported in Table 2.9.  Again, we find that most of the 
suicide-bombing response to drone strikes comes within a 100 to 300 kilometer range of North 
Waziristan.   




Number of Suicide Bombings in period t+ 4 weeks 
Variables 
Between 0-100 
KM from NW 
Between 100-200 
KM from NW 
Between 200-300 
KM from NW 
Between 300-

















Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F Statistic 5.22 9.24 4.08 3.41 
prob>F  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
All models contain a constant and have 438 observations.  Parentheses contain p values. *** p< 
0.01, ** p< 0.05 and * p<0.10. 
 
Next we investigate whether suicide-bombing responses to drone strikes really do dissipate after 400 
kilometers from North Waziristan as Tables 2.7 and 2.8 seem to suggest.  Table 2.9 addresses this issue 
by repeating 2SLS estimates in Tables 2.2 and 2.5 but considering suicide bombings only within a 400 
kilometer radius of North Waziristan.  The estimated coefficients of 0.45 and 1.49 are close to the earlier 
estimated coefficients of 0.38 and 1.45, suggesting that, indeed, the reaction dissipates by the 400 
kilometer mark.    
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Number of Suicide Bombing 






Other Control Variables Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes 
F Statistic 9.02 19.08 
prob> F 0.00 0.00 
All models contain a constant. Model for week level impact has 442 observations.  Model for 
follow-up impact has 438 observations Parentheses contain p values. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05 and 
* p<0.10. 
 
6 Further Robustness Checks 
 
We ran bivariate probit regression for which the dependent variable is 1 if there is a suicide attack within 
the week after a drone strike and 0 otherwise.  Again, we get a large and statistically significant effect 
of drone strikes on suicide attacks (Table 2.10).  




The Appendix reports estimates from a Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS) estimator (Table AP-2), 
which is more efficient than 2SLS and is also preferred if errors across equations are correlated 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). The results turn out to be quite similar to the 2SLS estimates. Finally, 
and 𝛾𝑡 is the error term.  The second-stage equation  AP-3 reports estimates using casualties in drone 
Variables 
Dependent Variable 
Number of Suicide Attacks 
 
Drone Strike (=1 if there is a strike) 
0.736** 
(0.02) 
Other Control Variables Yes 
Time Dummies Yes 
Wald Chi2 148.88 
Prob>Chi2 0.00 
The model contains a constant and have 442 observations.  Parentheses contain p values. *** 
p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05 and * p<0.10 
25 
 
strike rather than drone-strike events to explain deaths in suicide bombings.  Again, we find large and 
statistically significant effects that are supported by diagnostic tests.   
7 Discussion 
 
We find that drone strikes cause substantial increases in suicide bombing. These results are in conflict 
with theoretical propositions and empirical findings in Johnston & Sarbahi (2016), Mir and Moore 
(2018), Byman (2013) and Horowitz, Kreps and Fuhrmann (2016). However, none of these works 
grapple seriously with the endogeneity issue.  Both Mahmood and Jetter (2019) and Rigterink (2021) 
do account for endogeneity, in very different ways, and find that drone strikes cause terrorism.  
In contrast to all studies mentioned above, we specifically focus on suicide bombing.  When we use an 
OLS estimator to measure the parameters instead, the coefficient of drone strikes turns out be negative 
with weak statistical significance [Table 2.2]. This would imply, as most of the previous studies have 
found as well, that drone strikes deter suicide bombing. However, various diagnostic tests reported 
earlier provide evidence in support of the endogeneity of drone strikes and the use of instruments. This 
is true even when we use alternative specifications and estimators such as Bivariate Probit and 3SLS. 
Hence, the results from OLS estimation are biased and not reliable. It does sometimes happen that OLS 
and IV coefficients have opposiste signes, e.g., the influential paper by Levitt (1997) on the effect of 
police on crime. 
We have two major findings from our empirical analysis. First, an increase in drone strikes leads to an 
immediate increase of around 0.37-0.45 in suicide bombings. There is also evidence for at least 1 
additional suicide bombing on average within one month following a drone strike.  Possible blowback 
mechanisms are an increase in recruitment, perhaps including relatives of civilians killed in drone 
strikes, and retaliation.  Shah (2018) uses an opinion poll of residents in tribal areas to argue against the 
notion that drone strikes stimulate recruitment of militants. However, this sample is biased towards 
strata of society targeted by the Taliban and there are documented stories about individuals resorting to 
suicide bombings to avenge deaths of relatives in drone strikes. For example, one Pakistani reported 
that “My neighbor was so furious when a drone killed his mother, two sisters and his 7-year-old brother 
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last September that he filled his car with explosives and rammed it into a Pakistani army convoy. He 
had to avenge the death of his loved ones”.24  Tehrik Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have also claimed many 
attacks, such as the one in March 2009 in Lahore against the police academy, as retaliation for drone 
strikes.25 Feffer (2016) suggests, correctly in our view, that blowback can happen without a substantial 
fraction of the population turning to violence in response to drone strikes and without a general 
consensus that drone strikes are bad. Strong reactions from a small minority of the population are 
sufficient, especially if these reactions involve suicide bombings which cause roughly 13 deaths and 43 
injuries per attack.  The strengthened reactions we find to such drone strikes that eliminate militants’ 
leaders seem more likely to be driven by retaliation since such strikes to seem unlikely to particularly 
affect recruitment.  However, Rigterink (2021) argues that the best explanation involves splintering and 
infighting within terrorist group that leads to indiscipline after leaders are killed. 
The spatial allocation analysis suggests that the impact is exhausted within 0-400 km radius from North 
Waziristan. This radius covers almost all of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province, the capital city of 
Islamabad, major cities within Punjab province such as Rawalpindi, Faisalabad, Multan and the 
periphery of Lahore.  Saeed, Syed and Martin (2014) studied militancy patterns in Pakistan and found 
that a large fraction of the violence during the 2000s took place in KPK and the erstwhile FATA regions, 
primarily because it was the latter region that was the launching pad for insurgency in Pakistan. The 
interior Sindh and major parts of Baluchistan seem to be almost immune from suicide bombings in 
retaliation for drone strikes.  
   
  
                                                             
24 Cited in Williams (2010).  





Our findings suggest that drone strikes in Pakistan are counterproductive. Our analysis only includes 
strikes in North Waziristan, but these account for around 70 percent of all CIA drone strikes in Pakistan. 
Our main contribution is to use cloud cover, precipitation and a dummy for US drone base closure in 
Pakistan to instrument for drone strikes, thereby addressing an endogeneity problem that has plagued 
part of the literature in this area.   Diagnostic tests support both the existence of the endogeneity problem 
and the quality of our instruments.  The results indicate that drone strikes result, on average, in at least 
1 suicide bombing in the subsequent month. These results suggest that roughtly 27-33 percent of the 
suicide bombings occurring between July 2008 and the end of 2016 can be attributed to drone strikes.  
The impacts are strongest between 100 and 300 kilometers from drone strike locations with no 
statistically significant impact beyond a 400 kilometer radius.  The results also indicate particularly 
strong reactions to drone strikes that eliminate militants’ leadership. These findings are robust to 
different estimators and specifications, including LIML, 2SLS, 3SLS, GMM and Bivariate estimations. 
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 Table AP-1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
No. of Drone Strikes 0.672 1.18 0 7 
No. Killed in Drone Strikes 4.595 8.41 0 50 
No. of Leaders Killed in Drone Strikes 0.102 0.400 0 3 
No. of Suicide Bombings 0.921 1.13 0 6 
No. Killed in Suicide Bombings 11.98 22.10 0 108 
Cloud Cover (% of total sky) 11.70 9.24 0 46.29 
Precipitation mm 0.391 0.721 0 5.71 
Cloud Cover * Precipitation 59.24 154.80 0 1444.27 
Drone Base Closure 0.600 0.491 0 1 
Ramadan 0.104 0.306 0 1 
Muharram 0.090 0.287 0 1 
Elections 0.023 0.149 0 1 
Zarb e Azab 0.301 0.459 0 1 
Rah e Haq 0.075 0.263 0 1 
Rah e Rast 0.023 0.149 0 1 
     
 
TableAP-2 Instrumental Variable Regression with 3SLS 
Dependent Variable: No. of Suicide Bombings 














Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
All models contain a constant and have 442 observations.  Parentheses contain p values. *** p< 0.01, 





 Table AP-3 Instrumental Variable Regression 
Dependent Variable: No. of Suicide Bombings 
 
 Variables  2SLS with Newey-West S.E. 
No. of Fatalities in Drone Strikes 
1.34*** 
(0.00) 
Other Control Variables Yes  
Time Dummies Yes 
1st Stage F statistic 44.36 
Endogeneity Test  
Null Hypothesis= Variables are Exogenous 
9.12 
(0.00) 
F Statistic 4.18 
prob>F 0.00 
The model contains a constant and have 442 observations.  Parentheses contain p values. *** p< 
0.01, ** p< 0.05 and * p<0.10 
 
 
 
